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INTRODUCTION
The final judgment issued by Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson in
United States v. Microsoft Corp.1 calls for the division of Microsoft into
two independent businesses--an operating systems company and an
applications company. We show in this Article that, although the
breakup plan has spawned extensive attention and analysis, it involves
substantial problems that thus far have been completely overlooked by
the government, the court, and the commentators. A breakup of
Microsoft would involve substantial ``corporate finance’’ difficulties
and costs that would have to be addressed. In this Article, we propose to
identify and analyze these difficulties and costs and to explore and
assess how they could be best addressed. The problems that we identify
must be addressed if a breakup is to be pursued and should be taken into
account in making the basic decision of whether to break up Microsoft at
all.
Analysis of the breakup has thus far focused on two primary sets
of questions. First, many commentators have asked whether the
breakup is warranted from an antitrust perspective.2 Does Microsoft
actually possess and exercise monopoly power’ If so, would division
lead to enhanced competition or result in two mini-Microsoft
monopolists’
Could conduct remedies alone inhibit future
anticompetitive practices, or is a structural division required’ Implicit
in reaching these latter questions, of course, is the assumption that
implementation of a breakup is feasible.
The second set of questions addresses implementation and the
economic costs of splitting up Microsoft’s assets. Analysts concerned
with these issues have considered the consequences for Microsoft’s
shareholders of dividing the company’s business operations, patents,
and employees between two independent corporations, as well as the
cost of a breakup to consumers, suppliers, and other industry
participants.3 Although these undoubtedly are very important aspects
1.97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000). The Supreme Court decided not to take the
case on direct appeal, see Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 25 (2000), thus
enabling a review first by the court of appeals.
2. See, e.g., Lee Gomes & Rebecca Buckman, Unintended Consequences’ U.S. Plan to
Split Microsoft Might Not Be That Tidy After All, Critics Complain, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2000, at B1; George Bittlingmayer & Thomas W. Hazlett, DOS Kapital: Has Antitrust
Action Against Microsoft Created Value in the Computer Industry’ (1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors); Pierluigi Sabbatini, The Microsoft Case
(unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
3. See, e.g., Don Clark, Dividing Microsoft Isn’t Simple Math, WALL ST. J., June 8,
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of the breakup picture, they are not the questions that will concern us
here.
Our concern with the implementation of the breakup lies not in
the division of assets but in the division of the securities of the resultant
independent corporations. Let us assume that Microsoft’s assets and
people can be divided without too much difficulty. There remains the
matter of dividing the securities among Microsoft’s existing
shareholders. The government and its corporate finance experts have
claimed that the financial separation of the companies can be achieved
through a conventional corporate fission technique such as a spin-off or
split-off, a common corporate transaction that is ```similar to a number
of transactions that have been successfully accomplished in recent
business history.’’’4 As we will show, however, the ordered breakup is
fundamentally different from these standard transactions and raises
uncommon problems of valuation, taxation, control, and fairness.
In order to achieve an effective division of the businesses, the final
judgment prohibits Microsoft’s large shareholders from retaining an
equity interest in both of the resultant companies. In the next part of the
Article, we explain that this restriction, which precludes simple pro rata
distribution of the securities to Microsoft’s shareholders, distinguishes
the ordered breakup from conventional corporate reorganizations in a
way that raises substantial implementation problems.
In the following part, we consider three alternative means of
distributing the securities. First, the shares of a spun-off company could
be distributed pro rata to all existing Microsoft shareholders followed by
a mandated sale by the large shareholders of their interests in one of the
two firms. As we will see, however, this approach imposes high costs on
the large shareholders who would be required to sell. Immediate sale
would lead to immediate taxation and thus would eliminate the
opportunity that these shareholders otherwise would have to defer
2000, at B1; C. Boyden Gray, U.S. v. Microsoft: Remedies at the Expense of
Consumers (May 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Stan J.
Liebowitz, A Fool’s Paradise, The Windows World After a Forced Breakup of
Microsoft (Feb. 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Robert J.
Levinson et al., The Flawed Fragmentation Critique of Structural Remedies in the
Microsoft Case (Jan. 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Stan J.
Liebowitz, Breaking Windows, Estimating the Cost of Breaking up Microsoft
Windows (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
4.Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 37, Microsoft
Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233) (quoting Declaration of Robert F. Greenhill and Jeffrey
P. Williams ‘ 4, Microsoft Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233)). All court filings cited in this
Article
relating
to
the
litigation
may
be
found
at
Microsoft
<http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/msdoj/> (visited Jan. 24, 2000).
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billions of dollars in taxes. Furthermore, the mandated sale of large
blocks of stock in a hurry raises the specter of fire-sale pricing and the
potential loss of control premia.
Second, the division of securities could be made in such a way
that the large shareholders wind up with an increased stake in one of the
firms and no interest in the other. Because no one would be forced to sell
stock, such non-pro rata distribution would solve the tax problem and
the fire-sale discount problem, but this approach would introduce other
difficulties. In order to achieve pro rata distribution of total shareholder
value without distributing each of the securities pro rata, the relative
value of the two offshoots would have to be determined. We will
consider several ways of valuing the offshoots and their securities,
including expert appraisal and the use of market mechanisms, but
valuation will be difficult and to some extent inaccurate regardless of
the method that is employed. Furthermore, some valuation approaches
may enable the large shareholders to use their informational advantages
to extract additional value. Thus, non-pro rata distribution introduces a
very real risk of transferring value among Microsoft’s shareholders. A
third method that we consider would require amending the breakup
order, but would be consistent with its goal. Under this method, the
securities would be distributed pro rata as in a conventional spin-off,
and the large shareholders would be allowed to hold shares in both
companies.
To prevent them from wielding influence in both
companies, however, they would be precluded from exercising their
voting power in the offshoot of their choice. To this end, trustees could
be appointed to vote these neutralized shares in proportion to the voting
of other shares in any corporate ballot. If one of the large shareholders
sold these shares, however, the buyer would acquire normal voting
rights. This method would still impose costs on the large shareholders,
but it might turn out to be the method with least cost and least risk for
Microsoft’s shareholders.
Our goal in this Article, however, is not to determine the least
costly method of division but rather to highlight significant breakup
issues that have been overlooked. Any plan of separation that prohibits
Bill Gates and other large shareholders from owning shares in both
offshoots would involve considerable costs and difficulties. If a breakup
is to be pursued, the government and the courts should seek to address
these problems. Furthermore, these problems should be factored into the
larger analysis of whether a breakup of the company is warranted at all.
Accordingly, in the final part of the Article, we conclude that the
corporate finance issues we have raised should be taken into account in
any future consideration of the Microsoft breakup order.
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THE FINANCIAL COMPLEXITY OF THE BREAKUP
The Order
The district court order requires Microsoft to divide its businesses
into two independent corporations: an operating systems company (Ops
Co.) and an applications company (Apps Co.).5 The company has been
directed to develop a plan to accomplish the separation within twelve
months of the expiration of the stay entered by Judge Jackson pending
appeal of the judgment.6 Under the plan, the transfer of ownership must
be effected in such a manner that ``Covered Shareholders’’ do not own
stock in both Ops Co. and Apps Co.7 Covered Shareholders are defined
as Microsoft shareholders who are present or former employees, officers,
or directors and who owned, directly or beneficially, more than five
percent of Microsoft voting stock as of the date of entry of the final
judgment.8 The Covered Shareholders include, of course, Bill Gates,
who, according to Microsoft’s most recent proxy statement, owns
fourteen percent of Microsoft’s shares.9 The government’s submissions
to the trial court suggested that there are two other Covered
Shareholders,10 presumably Steve Ballmer and Paul Allen.11
5. See Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
6. See id.
7.In the language of the final judgment, the plan must provide for ``[t]he transfer
of ownership of the Separated Business by means of a distribution of stock of the
Separated Business to non-Covered Shareholders of Microsoft, or by other
disposition that does not result in a Covered Shareholder owning stock in both the
Separated Business and the Remaining Business.’’ Id. The Separated Business may be
either Apps Co. or Ops Co. and the Remaining Business will be the other.
A Covered Shareholder, moreover, who owns stock in one of the separated
companies may not serve as an officer, director, or employee of the other business.
In essence, the large shareholders are required to limit their investment and
management roles to one of the two offshoots. See id.
8. See id. at 71-72.
9. See MICROSOFT CORP ., 2000 PROXY STATEMENT (Sept. 28, 2000), available at
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/0000950109-00-500097.txt>.
10. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Final Judgment at 22,
Microsoft Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233).
11.Microsoft’s September 1999 Proxy Statement indicated the following beneficial
ownership: Gates, 15.3%; Allen: 5.1%; and Ballmer: 4.7%. See MICROSOFT CORP ., 1999
PROXY
STATEMENT
(SEPT.
28,
1999),
available
at
<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/0001032210-99-001374.txt>.
Microsoft’s more recent proxy statement of September 2000 indicated the following
beneficial ownership: Gates, 13.7%; Ballmer, 4.5%. See MICROSOFT CORP ., supra note 9.
Allen has sold a large quantity of shares over the past year and probably now holds
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The prohibition on cross-shareholding by the Covered
Shareholders was sought and adopted in order to prevent these
individuals from wielding influence in both companies after the
breakup--to ensure, in other words, an effective separation of the
offshoots. This restriction is the source of the difficulties that are the
focus of this Article’s analysis.
The Government’s Position that Dividing the Securities is
Straightforward
Assume that the assets have been partitioned and the employees,
physical and intellectual property, and other assets of one of the
businesses have been transferred to New Co., which is 100% owned by
Microsoft. Aside from the New Co. stock, Microsoft now holds only the
assets that shall remain with the other business. The government has
suggested that from this point forward separation would be a routine
and straightforward matter.12
Testifying for the government, two investment bankers put
forward one possible separation scenario.13 They suggested that in
accordance with standard industry practice Microsoft could sell up to
twenty percent of the shares of New Co. through an initial public
offering (IPO) and follow the IPO with a tax free split-off or spin-off of
the remaining New Co. equity to the Microsoft shareholders.14 The
bankers testified that separations of this type are common, and they
envisioned no difficulty in modifying the split-off or spin-off mechanism
to ensure that Covered Shareholders wind up with shares of only one of
the two companies.15 In short, the government and the bankers appear
well under 5% of the shares. See Don Clark & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft’s Allen to
Leave Board, Become Adviser, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at B2. According to the final
judgment, however, the date of final judgment would be used to determine who is a
Covered Shareholder. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 71
(D.D.C. 2000). In any event, in our analysis we will abstract from these issues and
will focus on the Covered Shareholder concept generally. Accordingly, we will
assume that Bill Gates and possibly one or two additional shareholders would be
affected by the restrictions placed on Covered Shareholders.
12. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final Judgment at 9-10,
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (Nos. 98-1232, 981233).
13. See Declaration of Robert F. Greenhill and Jeffrey P. Williams ‘‘ 42-48, Microsoft
Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233). Of course, Apps Co. shares could be split-off or spunoff without an initial public offering.
14. See id. ‘‘ 45-48.
15. See id. ‘‘ 48-49.
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to view this as a standard spin-off transaction, underestimating the
difficulties involved.
Why The Division of Securities is Not Straightforward
Although the designer must be careful not to jeopardize the taxfree exchange aspects of the conventional spin-off, the financial
dimension of the standard spin-off transaction is straightforward.
Whether the transaction is proceeded by an IPO or not, a standard spinoff results in the pro rata distribution of shares in the new company to
the shareholders of the old company. Accordingly, there is no need to
value either business.16 All shareholders receive a pro rata fraction of
the combined value of the two companies by definition.
The court-ordered breakup of AT&T and Hewlett-Packard’s
strategic spin-off of Agilent Technologies fit within this model of
conventional spin-offs. In 1982 AT&T reached an agreement with the
Justice Department to end the national telephone monopoly.17 AT&T
created seven regional companies that would provide local telephone
services, while AT&T would retain the long distance and telephone
equipment manufacturing businesses.18 The local telephone service
assets were transferred to the regional subsidiaries, and then the
securities of these companies were distributed to the AT&T shareholders
to finalize the separation. The AT&T shareholders received one share of
common stock in each of the seven regional telephone companies for
every ten shares of AT&T they held.
For purely strategic reasons, Hewlett-Packard (H-P) recently
decided to separate its test and measurement equipment manufacturing
business from the remainder of its operations.19 H-P created the Agilent
Technologies subsidiary to house these specialty assets and then sold
sixteen percent of the shares of Agilent through an IPO in November
1999.20 H-P completed the spin-off in June 2000 by distributing the
remaining eighty-four percent of the Agilent shares to H-P shareholders
16.An IPO provides a measure of the value of the new company, but this
measurement is not needed to divide the value fairly among the existing
shareholders of the old company.
17. See W. B ROOKE TUNSTALL, DISCONNECTING PARTIES: MANAGING THE B ELL
SYSTEM B REAKUP: AN INSIDE VIEW 56-57 (1985).
18. See id.
19. See Clark, supra note 3, at B1.
20. See Khanh T.L. Tran, H-P’s Agilent Spinoff Greeted Warmly on Wall Street, as Stock
Climbs 41%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1999, at B3.
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pro rata.21
The ownership of AT&T and H-P was and is diffuse, but diffuse
ownership is not a prerequisite for preserving relative shareholder value
through a conventional spin-off. A company with a controlling
shareholder could spin-off a division without risk of transferring value
to or from the controller, as long as all shareholders wind up with a pro
rata fraction of the shares of both companies. The controlling
shareholder, however, must be allowed to hold shares in both firms after
the spin-off in order to ensure preservation of each stockholder’s
relative share of the value of the combined enterprises.
In contrast, in the case of Microsoft, the company cannot simply
distribute the shares of the spun-off business pro rata and leave it at
that. The court has concluded that effective separation of the businesses
would be undermined if the large Microsoft shareholders were to retain
an equity stake in both the spun-off and the surviving company.22 Thus,
at the end of the relevant period, the Covered Shareholders may not
hold shares in both Ops Co. and Apps Co., and the conventional spin-off
technique must be revised or supplemented in some way to meet this
additional requirement.
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE DIVISION OF SECURITIES
Microsoft has been charged with proposing a detailed plan for the
breakup including the distribution of corporate securities in a fashion
that complies with the prohibition on Covered Shareholder cross
shareholding.23 Below, we explore the two alternative approaches that
could be used to accomplish the distribution in compliance with the
prohibition--spin-off followed by sale and non-pro rata distribution.
Given the difficulties and costs identified with these approaches, the last
section of this part considers a third approach that would require
refinement of the prohibition but would be consistent with its spirit and
that might eliminate some (but not all) costs. Before examining these
approaches, however, we will begin by addressing a matter that is
common to all three--indirect penalties on individual shareholders.

21. See Business Brief, Hewlett-Packard Co.: Agilent Spinoff Completion, Stock Conversion
Are Set, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2000, at A12.
22. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65
(D.D.C. 2000).
23. See id. at 64.
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Preliminary Notes on Costs to Shareholders
As the analysis below will show, any method of division of the
securities in compliance with the language or even the spirit of the
breakup order would impose a significant cost on the Covered
Shareholders or create a risk of transfer among shareholders, a transfer
which again would impose a loss on some shareholders to the benefit of
others. This conclusion is quite relevant for consideration of the
breakup order because individual penalties on Microsoft shareholders
are not contemplated in the government’s submissions or arguments,
nor in the court’s judgment.
The government has not requested the imposition of penalties on
individual shareholders, and it has suggested, implicitly or explicitly,
that the breakup would not involve such penalties.24 The Covered
Shareholders were not personally named in the indictment, the
government has not argued that penalties on these or any other
Microsoft shareholders are warranted, and the Covered Shareholders
and other Microsoft shareholders have not been given an opportunity to
respond to such arguments. In fact, it has been the government’s
position that, aside from the elimination of the opportunity to take
monopoly profits, Microsoft shareholders will be no worse off following
the breakup.25 The breakup order, which adopts the government’s
requested remedy, similarly does not contemplate the imposition of
significant penalties on the Covered Shareholders or any other Microsoft
shareholder.26
To be sure, it might be argued that penalties on some shareholders
would be warranted in this case. The Covered Shareholders, it might be
argued, deserve to be penalized individually for their roles in a company
that violated the antitrust laws. Gates and Ballmer, in particular, shared
responsibility for setting corporate policy and ensuring compliance.
More generally, one could take the view that it is valid to impose on
shareholders of a company that has been found to violate the antitrust
laws whatever costs are needed to create more competitive conditions.
Whatever one’s view on these questions, however, it is clear as a
matter of due process that substantial financial penalties should not be
imposed on individuals in the absence of a conscious judicial
determination that finds them warranted. Accordingly, if one were to
24. See Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Final Judgment
at 22-23, Microsoft Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233).
25. See id.
26. See Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64-74.
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find that the division of securities accompanying the breakup would
impose large costs on shareholders, that determination would have to be
given significant attention in any future examination of the breakup
order.
Pro Rata Spin Off Followed by Sales
One method that can be used to distribute the securities in
compliance with the cross-shareholding prohibition, and perhaps the
most natural one, would be for Microsoft to undertake a conventional
pro rata spin-off and then require the Covered Shareholders to sell their
holdings in one of the two companies quickly. Under the time frame
specified in the final judgment, the spin-off and subsequent sales all
would have to occur within twelve months.27 The primary advantage of
this approach is that it eliminates any valuation problems. As discussed
above, a pro rata spin-off fairly distributes the value of the combined
companies between the shareholders of the former unitary firm. There
are several problems with this approach, however, that should be
recognized.
Tax Penalty
The Microsoft breakup raises two distinct tax issues. First, as in
any corporate reorganization, it is imperative that the distribution of the
securities to the shareholders be effected in a manner that avoids
recognition of gains. Otherwise, all shareholders who receive a
distribution and who have enjoyed a gain on their Microsoft investment
would be taxable on a portion of their profits. Because a spin-off
followed by the sale of the stock of one of the entities can be a means of
distributing corporate earnings and profits while avoiding the dividend
provisions of the tax laws, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is
suspicious of pro rata divisions that are followed by significant sales,
particularly if the stock sales are planned in advance of the spin-off.28 In
27. See id. at 64. It is not clear that a spin-off followed by a sale of stock by the
Covered Shareholders falls within the literal language of the final judgment, which
requires that the transfer of ownership of the Separated Business be effected by a
distribution or other disposition that does not result in Covered Shareholders
owning stock in both businesses. See supra note 7. The two-step process clearly
seems to meet the court’s objective, however.
28. See Treas. Reg. ‘ 1.355-2(d)(2) (2000).
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this case, however, the division and the divestment of the Covered
Shareholders’ stakes in one of the entities are mandated by court order.
The motivation for the transactions is not in question, and we will
assume that Microsoft would be able to obtain a ruling from the IRS that
the required sales in this instance would not jeopardize the tax-free
status of the spin-off transaction.
Ensuring that the spin-off is tax free should satisfy the nonCovered Shareholders who wind up with shares in both companies and
no recognition of gain. The Covered Shareholders who would be
required to divest themselves of the shares of one of the two companies
under this scenario, however, would not be so lucky. Sale of their shares
would result in taxation of gains, and, even at the historically low
federal capital gains tax rate of twenty percent, the tax bills would be
very large.29
Assuming that the market value of Microsoft would be equally
divided between Apps Co. and Ops Co., Bill Gates would be required to
divest shares worth over $20 billion at current market prices.30 Because
the basis in these shares probably is quite low, a very large portion of the
proceeds would be subject to federal and perhaps state capital gains
taxes.
In the absence of a divestment requirement, the Covered
Shareholders, like all the other shareholders, would be able to defer gain
recognition and postpone the tax indefinitely. Indeed, if the Covered
Shareholders were to hold these shares until death, their gains on this
stock would never be taxed since their heirs would receive a stepped-up
basis.31 Spin-off followed by forced sale, then, appears to impose a
significant penalty on the Covered Shareholders that presumably was
not contemplated by the designers of the remedy--in Gates’ case the
elimination of the opportunity to defer billions of dollars of taxes.
Of course, the tax penalty would be mitigated if the Covered
Shareholders were to donate the shares to charity rather than sell them,
but contributing shares to charity to avoid tax on a sale does not
eliminate the financial penalty; it simply shifts the point of application.
Gates, in particular, has donated very large sums to his foundation over
29.Of course state as well as federal tax may be assessed on the Covered
Shareholders’ capital gains.
30.All figures are based on information available in January 2001. The $20 billion
figure is based on Microsoft’s recent stock price of $55-60 per share and on Gates’
holding of 731,750,000 shares according to Microsoft’s most recent proxy statement.
31. See I.R.C. ‘ 1014 (2000). Company founders and large shareholders often defer
selling shares despite the benefits that they would gain through diversification
because it is more attractive to postpone (and possibly avoid) taxes on the gains.
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recent years.32 In selecting a remedy, however, we should not assume
that he is interested in donating what might be half of his wealth to
charity now. Even if he wishes to give such an amount to charity
eventually, donating the entire amount in one year could be very
inefficient.33
Theoretically, the accelerated taxation problem also could be
solved by permitting these individuals to sell the required shares and
reinvest the proceeds in similar property on a tax-free basis. A tax
holiday on the sale or like-kind exchange of securities would be most
unusual,34 but then again so is the remedy that is being imposed by the
court. Even if this modification were politically feasible, however, it
would not be a perfect solution. In fact, it would provide a windfall to
the Covered Shareholders by providing them with a means of
diversifying tax free that is not available to other shareholders.35
Fire Sale and Potential Loss of Control Premia
A second cost to the Covered Shareholders might arise from the
32.According to Microsoft’s press materials, the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation is endowed at over $21 billion. See Microsoft Corp., Bill Gates’ Biography,
available at <http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/bio>.
33. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ‘ 7.03 (4th ed. 1985).
Donation of appreciated property generally is tax efficient. The donor receives a
deduction equal to the appreciated value of the stock and the gift does not trigger
recognition of the gain. The deduction generally is limited to 30% of adjusted gross
income, however. So even though excess contributions can be carried forward for
five years, it could be difficult to take advantage of one-time gifts of this magnitude.
See id.
34. See id. Although unusual, legislative relief focused upon the otherwise harsh
tax consequences of an antitrust-related divestment would not be unprecedented.
When E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company was forced to dispose of its holdings of
General Motors stock in the 1960s to resolve antitrust concerns, a law was passed that
caused the distribution to shareholders to be treated as a return of capital rather than
a dividend. See JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE L AW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ‘ 38B.85
(1991).
Real estate and most other business and investment property aside from
corporate securities may be exchanged for business or investment property of like
kind with no recognition of gain or loss. See I.R.C. ‘ 1031 (1994). If shareholders
were permitted to avoid gain recognition through like kind exchange, however, stock
market gains would approach tax-exempt status. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 33, ‘
17.03.
35.The breakup order, which did not consider the possible tax penalty on the
Covered Shareholders, obviously did not consider any kind of tax holiday on sale
and reinvestment.
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requirement that they sell these large blocks of stock in a hurry. An
immediate sale requirement might prevent the Covered Shareholders
from capturing a price that reflects the full value of their stock.
Consider the position of Bill Gates specifically for a moment.
Gates would be forced to sell a fourteen percent stake in one of the firms
following a pro rata spin-off. In a large, otherwise diffusely held
company, a block of this magnitude is worth more per share than
dispersely held shares. The premium exists because the block carries
with it control of the firm, the possibility of gaining control, or at least
influence over the firm. In fact, when large blocks of stock are sold
under normal circumstances, the seller generally receives an abovemarket per share price.36
If the shares were to be sold diffusely, this premium would be lost.
But even without the control premium, the block would be worth over
$20 billion today, so the number of potential buyers for the whole block
would be quite limited. Given the small universe of potential buyers for
the block and the short time frame in which to make the sale, Gates
would be in a very poor bargaining position and might be forced to sell
diffusely or to accept a fire-sale price for the block. Either way Gates
would be unlikely to receive the premium value that normally would be
associated with a block of this size.
The nature of the block purchaser presents another issue. It is
very unlikely that an individual could be found to purchase a twenty
billion dollar block, so, if the shares were to be sold as a block, a
corporation would be the probable buyer. One natural buyer would be a
large company already in or seeking to enter the computer or Internet
industry. If a major industry player, such as AOL Time Warner or
Oracle, were to purchase the block and gain control of the Microsoft
offshoot, however, the objective of increasing competition within the
industry might be jeopardized. It is also possible that the block could be
sold to a new entrant into the industry or to a general holding company
such as Berkshire Hathaway, but, in any event, negotiating such a sale
would not be easy, and a forced sale might result in a significant loss to
Gates given the small number of possible buyers.37 Other Covered
36. See Michael Barclay & Clifford Holderness, The Law and Large-Block Trades, 35
J.L. & ECON. 265, 266-67 (1992); Michael Barclay & Clifford Holderness, Negotiated
Block Trades and Corporate Control, 46 J. FIN. 861 (1991); Michael Barclay & Clifford
Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371
(1989).
37.The corporate purchaser in a large block transaction often pays for the stock
with its own shares or a combination of shares and cash. See DALE A. OESTERLE, T HE
L AW OF MERGERS , ACQUISITIONS, AND REORGANIZATIONS 35 (1991). Although the final
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Shareholders, if any, would face somewhat similar problems, but their
much smaller blocks would be easier to sell and would be less likely to
carry a control premium, so diffuse sale of these shares would be less of
an issue.
A third possibility, in addition to diffuse sale and sale of the blocks
to outsiders, would be for the Microsoft offshoots to buy the shares back
from the Covered Shareholders after the spin-off has been accomplished
and market prices have been established. In this scenario, however, the
market mechanism for valuing Gates’ control premium is lost, and any
value given to Gates beyond the market value of the shares surely would
be contested by other shareholders as the result of self-dealing. As
discussed below, if the shares that must be divested are not going to be
sold in the market, a superior internal solution can be envisioned.
Non-Pro Rata Distribution of the Securities
We now turn to the second method for distributing the securities
in compliance with the cross-shareholding prohibition. Under this
method, the securities of the offshoots would be divided so that Covered
Shareholders receive no shares in one of the firms and a larger than pro
rata fraction of the shares in the other. We will refer to such an
approach as a non-pro rata method of distribution.
The language of the government’s proposed remedy and the final
judgment seems to envision that a plan involving non-pro rata
distribution would be used to divide the securities in the two companies
in such a way that the Covered Shareholders do not hold shares in
both.38 The order specifically suggests ``a distribution of stock of the
Separated Business to non-Covered Shareholders of Microsoft.’’39 Of
course, simply distributing the stock of the spun-off business to nonCovered Shareholders will not do. Such a distribution would leave the
Covered Shareholders with a severely diminished stake overall. The
value of the interests of Covered and non-Covered Shareholders could
be preserved, however, by having certain shareholders surrender shares
in one company in exchange for shares in the other. In the language of
judgment prohibits the Covered Shareholders from owning shares in both Microsoft
offshoots, it does not address the possibility of these individuals owning shares in a
company that owns a significant stake in one of the offshoots. Such an arrangement
would be disfavored.
38. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000);
Plaintiff’s Proposed Final Judgment at 4, Microsoft Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233).
39. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
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corporate reorganizations, a divisive transaction in which shares of the
parent corporation are exchanged for shares of the newly independent
subsidiary is known as a split-off.
Another standard divisive transaction, known as a split-up, also
could be used to accomplish the desired objective. In this scenario
Microsoft would form two subsidiaries containing the assets of Ops Co.
and Apps Co. On division, the shares of these two companies would be
distributed non-pro rata so that the Covered Shareholders would not be
in violation of the cross-shareholding prohibition. Because no one
would be required to sell any shares in a split-off or split-up scenario,
the accelerated taxation and fire sale problems would be eliminated.
Non-pro rata distribution, however, raises other difficult problems.
For simplicity of exposition we generally will assume in the
following discussion that Microsoft undertakes a split-up transaction in
which shares of the parent are exchanged for shares of Apps Co. or Ops
Co., in the case of the Covered Shareholders, or for shares of both, in the
case of non-Covered Shareholders.40 The exchange ratios, i.e., the
number of shares of parent stock surrendered for shares of the newly
formed offshoots, will depend on the relative value of the pieces and
whether the shareholder is obtaining a stake in Ops Co., Apps Co., or
both.
An example may be helpful. Assume for the moment that Gates is
the only Covered Shareholder and that it is determined that Ops Co. is
worth 50% of Apps Co. To preserve everyone’s fraction of the combined
corporate value (but ignoring the value of control), Gates’ 14% share of
the parent would be exchanged for a 42% stake in Ops Co. or a 21%
stake in Apps Co. In the former case the remaining shares in the parent
would be exchanged pro rata for 58% of Ops Co. and 100% of Apps Co.;
in the latter case for 79% of Apps Co. and 100% of Ops Co. As in this
example, we will generally focus our analysis in this subsection on
Gates, the Covered Shareholder with the largest stake.
Valuation and Fair Division
The primary challenge involved in non-pro rata distribution of
the securities would be to ensure pro rata distribution of shareholder
value, and that would require ex ante determination of the relative value
40.As the reader will readily see, the points we make here are general and are
not particular to this example. An analysis focusing on a split-off transaction would
reach the same result.
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of the separated companies. As discussed above, the advantage of the
pro rata spin-off technique is that there is no need to establish the value
of the parts. Because each shareholder gets the same fraction of each of
the pieces, the relative value of the two parts is irrelevant.41 No
transfers between shareholders arise. In the AT&T and H-P spin-offs,
for example, it was unnecessary to estimate the value of the offshoots or
of the rump companies ex ante. Although H-P made an initial public
offering in the shares of Agilent before spinning off the remaining shares
to H-P shareholders, this process had no effect on the relative
distribution of the securities to shareholders.
Ex ante determination of relative company value is unavoidable in
the non-pro rata distribution scenario, however. If, for example, a
Covered Shareholder is to receive more shares of Ops Co. and no shares
of Apps Co., the relative share values must be determined to decide how
many more shares of Ops Co. he is to receive. This aspect of a non-pro
rata scheme is particularly worrisome because valuing the Microsoft
offshoots would be especially difficult. The breakup would create two
large companies, quite dissimilar from others in the industry, which
come into existence under unique circumstances. Given the legal and
economic uncertainties surrounding their births and other factors, it is
generally acknowledged that valuing the Microsoft offshoots would be
particularly speculative.42 A small error in the relative valuations,
moreover, could result in a transfer of billions of dollars between
Covered and non-Covered Shareholders.
If the offshoots must be valued, there are two main ways of
proceeding. Valuation may be based on expert estimation or on stock
market prices. There are problems involved with each alternative.

41.This is true even if the spin-off is preceded by an IPO of the new company. In
this case the ``piece’’ that is divided amongst the shareholders of the old company is
the stake retained by the old company in the new company following the IPO.
42.The government suggests that the sum of the value of the offshoots could
exceed the value of the whole and, thus, that Microsoft’s shareholders might be better
off following the breakup. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Proposed Final
Judgment at 37, Microsoft Corp. (Nos. 98-1232, 98-1233). On the other hand, however,
the government argues that the breakup is needed to reduce monopoly power and
monopoly profits. See id. at 33. If the government is right in believing that the
breakup will reduce monopoly profits now or in the future, it seems very unlikely that
the shareholders would be as well or better off. Of course the government is trying to
put forth its best case on each issue; it is not trying to calculate value. The apparent
inconsistency in the government’s positions, however, highlights the difficulty that an
expert would face in valuing these businesses.
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Valuation Based on Expert Estimation
An expert or experts could be hired to estimate the relative value
of the two offshoots and to calculate exchange ratios for a non-pro rata
division, but there are several difficulties with this approach. First, one
would need to ensure that the expert’s appraisals were not biased.
Given the uncertainty in valuation, an expert would have a great deal of
discretion in determining the fair value of the two Microsoft pieces. If
the expert were to be appointed by the company, there might be some
concern that the expert would be influenced to produce a relative value
estimate that favors the Covered Shareholders.43 For example, an
investment bank might be enlisted to perform the valuation, and the
bank might have other business or desire to do more business with the
company managed by the Covered Shareholders. This conflict of
interest could very well work to the disadvantage of the non-Covered
Shareholders.44 For this reason, it might be better to have the expert
appointed by the court.
Even if an expert can be relied upon to produce unbiased
estimates of value, though, the uncertainty problem remains, and with it
the possibility of a significant error in relative valuation. As noted
above, estimating the value of these companies would be especially
speculative and prone to error. Thus, however carefully the expert is
chosen and despite painstaking efforts to guard against the introduction
of bias, one would remain concerned that either the Covered or nonCovered Shareholders would lose a great deal of value in the process.
Finally, the expert valuation process could be time consuming and
costly. The parties and/or the court must vet and settle upon an expert
or experts. Given the uncertainty in valuation, the risk of bias, and the
large stakes involved, it might be felt that the various stakeholders
should have a right as part of the process to challenge the valuations
produced. If there is no administrative avenue for contesting the
results--and perhaps even if there is--it would not be surprising if the
results of the process were challenged in the courts.
For all of these reasons--estimation uncertainty, the potential for
bias, and the possibility of a lengthy and litigated process--reliance on
43. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair
Are They and What Can Be Done About It’ 1989 DUKE L.J. 27 (1989).
44. See id. at 41-42. The potential conflict of interest might be mitigated if the
Covered Shareholders were to choose to align themselves with different entities or if
their choices could be kept secret until the estimates were produced. The nonCovered Shareholders could rely on neither eventuality transpiring, however.
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expert estimation would be problematic. The question, then, is whether
an objective, market-based mechanism could be designed as a substitute
for expert valuation.
Valuation Based on Market Prices
As an alternative to expert valuation, the securities could be
allocated based on market values for the two companies that would be
established through an IPO or IPOs. For example, the assets of Apps Co.
and Ops Co. could be placed in two newly created Microsoft subsidiaries
leaving nothing in Microsoft Corporation except for the shares of the
subsidiaries. Ten to twenty percent of the shares of each subsidiary
could be sold through IPOs. Trading in these shares would establish
market prices for the stock of each offshoot and determine the ratios for
exchanging shares of Microsoft Corporation for shares of Apps Co. and
Ops Co.45
This scenario raises several important questions: Is a Covered
Shareholder permitted to choose the company in which he will retain his
interest’ If so, does he choose before or after market prices have been
established’ If he chooses before, is that decision kept secret or made
public, and can he make a selection that is contingent on the relative
values that result’
Under the breakup plan the Covered Shareholders would be
forced to divest themselves of their economic and operational interests
in one of the two offshoots. Allowing the Covered Shareholders to
choose ``their’’ offshoot creates a number of issues, but it might seem
important that these individuals be given that choice. Gates and
Ballmer obviously are not just financial investors; their careers and lives
are invested in Microsoft’s businesses. Choosing how and where one
works is an important right, and it will be assumed below that the
Covered Shareholders would be permitted to make this choice either
45.Although the split-up example is perhaps the simplest to envision, it is not
necessary to float shares in both offshoots to compute the relative valuation of the
companies. Suppose alternatively that Microsoft were to create a single subsidiary
that contained the assets of Ops Co. or Apps Co. and that Microsoft Corporation
retained the assets of the other business as well as the stock of the subsidiary. An
IPO in the shares of the subsidiary would provide a market value for that business,
and the market value of the other business could be determined algebraically from
the market value of the subsidiary and that of the parent. It may be feasible,
moreover, to distribute some of the subsidiary shares to existing shareholders and
generate a market and market values without resorting to the IPO market.
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before or after the relative values are determined. One cannot know in
advance, however, whether the Covered Shareholders would be driven
more by personal wealth considerations or by their vocational interests
in making their choice. As we proceed, we will often assume that the
Covered Shareholders are focusing primarily upon their pocketbooks.
The reader should keep in mind, however, as do we, that non-monetary
factors may have greater weight. For simplicity, we will again focus on
Gates in this analysis.
First, assume that Gates chooses which company he will control
and manage after the market prices have been established. Gates may
have a distinct informational advantage in making his selection.
Having co-founded and run Microsoft up to the point of the breakup,
Gates presumably has a large amount of ``soft’’ private information
concerning the various operations and their prospects that is not
available to public investors. The evidence on the permissible stock
trading by corporate insiders suggests that executives achieve
substantial abnormal returns when trading in the stock of their
companies.46 This phenomenon indicates that access to soft information
enables insiders to make better judgments than the markets as to value.
If, in light of his informational advantage, Gates has a superior ability to
judge relative value, he might discover that the market values that are
established undervalue one of the two offshoots. He could then choose
to shift his investment into the relatively undervalued company and
achieve more than his pro rata fraction of the combined value of the two
companies.
To protect against this possibility, one could consider scenarios in
which Gates makes a choice between the companies in advance of the
establishment of relative market values. This choice could be kept secret
until the market prices are established or it could be made public. In the
former case the market would receive no information from Gates’
selection. In this case, to the extent that Gates can anticipate the values
that the market will set, Gates would be able to capture an expected gain
using his informational advantage just as he would were he to choose ex
post after prices are set.
In the latter case--in which Gates’ advance selection is made
public--the market would be able to draw inferences from Gates’ choice
as to his judgment regarding the relative value of the companies. In this
case, Gates’ strategy would be even more complicated. In addition to
46.For a discussion of this evidence, see Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of
Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 336-37
(1998).
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weighing his vocational preference and estimating the market’s
valuation of the offshoots as an independent matter, Gates would need
to consider what inference the market would draw from his public
election. Because Gates has vocational interests and would not be a pure
investor, however, the market would not be able to infer fully Gates’
private information and estimates from his election. Thus, such
inferences would diminish, but not eliminate, Gates’ informational
advantage.
In the foregoing analysis of scenarios in which Gates makes a
selection in advance (whether the selection is made public or kept
secret), we have assumed that Gates would be able to anticipate the
relative values that would be set by the market. If Gates were to make
an incorrect assessment, however, value would transfer from Gates to
the non-Covered Shareholders. Indeed, some might take the view that
requiring Gates to choose the company in which his interest will be
concentrated before the relative values are determined would unfairly
place him at risk.47
To address this concern, we can envision another market-based
method of distribution in which Gates would be required to elect ``his’’
company in advance but conditional on the relative market value of the
offshoots. Gates might elect to have his investment shifted to Apps Co.,
for example, if, but only if, the market capitalization of Apps Co. were
no more than a specified percentage of the market capitalization of Ops
Co.
Here again there are two options: the details of the conditional
choice could be made public or kept secret. If the choice were kept
secret, this approach would be no different than permitting Gates to
choose ex post, and there would be no mitigation of Gates’ informational
advantage. Disclosing Gates’ predetermined breakpoint, on the other
hand, would provide the market with some information about Gates’
estimation of the relative values of the two companies;48 but it would
47.Of course, others might take the view that forcing Gates to make his choice of
offshoot unconditionally (that is, not contingent on the relative values) is not unfair.
After all, the non-Covered Shareholders get no choice in the matter, and their
interests are influenced by Gates’ choice. The difference, though, is that Gates’ entire
Microsoft investment will be shifted into one company or the other. In contrast, even
though non-Covered Shareholders will also wind up with somewhat disproportionate
interests in the two companies, their investment will not be fully shifted to one of the
resultant companies.
48.It has been argued that corporate insiders should be required to disclose their
intent to trade stock in their companies several days in advance of their trades. The
market presumably would learn to distinguish between liquidity trades and trades
that are based on soft (or perhaps at times ``hard’’) inside information, and prices
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not eliminate the informational asymmetry, as investors would have to
assess the extent to which economic considerations, as opposed to
vocational preferences, influenced the breakpoint. This arrangement
would, of course, give rise to various strategic considerations. Knowing
that the market would make inferences from his disclosed breakpoint,
Gates might adjust his breakpoint; the market would recognize this
possibility and respond accordingly; and so on. An analysis of the
tactics that might be employed in such a case is beyond the scope of this
Article, but these issues would need to be addressed before settling on
such an approach.
Aside from the informational and strategic issues considered
above, there is one consideration that favors having the Covered
Shareholders make an unconditional and publicly disclosed choice prior
to the IPO. Gates and Ballmer presumably will maintain an active role
in one of the two companies, although not necessarily the same
company, and their investments must lie in the companies they manage.
It may be necessary to establish the roles of these individuals early in
the process in order to lessen the uncertainty for investors and
employees.
This dilemma--who chooses and when--becomes more difficult
when we consider that post-IPO market prices are not necessarily
accurate or stable. Market prices may be more accurate than ex ante
estimates, but new stocks often do not settle into a trading range relative
to their peers for some time, and the relative market value of Apps Co.
and Ops Co. may fluctuate significantly in the early months following
the IPOs. Thus, the choice of the date or period over which the exchange
ratios are calculated could have a profound effect on the distribution of
value under a non-pro rata scheme of division.

Loss of Control Premia
The existence of a control premium makes it even harder to effect
a non-pro rata division without transferring value between the parties.
Gates’ fourteen percent block provides a substantial measure of control,
and, accordingly, his block is worth more per share than the shares of
would adjust in such a way as to reduce insiders’ excess trading profits. See Fried,
supra note 50, at 349-50. Our approach here simply applies this thinking to a one-time
opportunity for the exploitation of inside information.
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public investors. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the value
of a control block is a function of the size of the assets under control. A
non-pro rata split-off or split-up will significantly reduce the number of
assets under Gates’ control. He will wind up with an increased
percentage of the shares of one offshoot but no stake at all in the other.
There may be some incremental value associated with increasing the
size of a control stake in one of the companies, but once the stake is large
enough to provide control, added shares should not carry a large
premium over the market price. In any event, any added value arising
from a greater stake in one of the offshoots is likely to be more than
offset by the loss of control over the other half of the assets.
Moreover, the other shareholders would benefit from Gates’ loss.
Formerly, their likelihood of receiving a takeover premium was reduced
by the presence of a dominant shareholder who might oppose the
takeover. After the split-up they are likely to own shares in one
company that lacks a dominant shareholder and is a better takeover
candidate. Thus, in order to prevent a transfer from Gates to the other
shareholders, one would have to calculate the value of the control
premium lost and gained and take this into account in setting the share
exchange ratios.
Once the positions of the other Covered Shareholders are
considered, the control premium picture becomes even more complex.
A five percent stake in Microsoft probably carries no control premia
currently, particularly since Gates holds a much larger stake. One can
imagine a case, though, in which another Covered Shareholder chooses
to join the smaller offshoot while Gates goes with the larger. If the two
firms are very different in size, a five percent stake could mushroom to
fifteen percent or higher.49 It is conceivable, then, that a Covered
Shareholder could acquire a control premium through a non-pro rata
division of the securities. In any event, control premia and possible
changes in control further complicate the non-pro rata division
scenarios.
Risk-Bearing and Liquidity Costs
Assume for the moment that valuation of the Microsoft offshoots
and of control premia are not an issue. Non-pro rata division still could
produce difficulties because the Covered Shareholders would wind up
49.A 5% stake would grow to 15% if a 5% shareholder wound up with shares in
an offshoot that represented one-third of the combined value of the companies.
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with a larger percentage share of a smaller company. This compression
raises several possible problems. First, concentration of their stakes into
a smaller entity would impose substantial risk-bearing costs on the
Covered Shareholders who would be much less diversified following the
breakup. Diversification would be sacrificed even if the offshoots were
evenly sized, but this effect would be aggravated for a Covered
Shareholder if his stake were shifted to the smaller of two unevenly
sized offshoots. Gates follows a policy of gradually selling shares in the
company.50 As a result, it is reasonable to assume from this practice that
diversification has a significant benefit for him, and it is fair to assume
that it would for the others as well.51
Second, if the offshoots were unevenly matched in market
capitalization, a combined Gates-Ballmer stake in the smaller company
might have negative consequences on value because the public market
in this heavily concentrated stock would be less liquid. Moreover, if one
of the two companies were much smaller than the other, one or more of
the Covered Shareholders might be precluded from holding a stake in
the company of their choice. If one of the offshoots represents less than
about twenty percent of the combined value, these two individuals
could not squeeze their investments into the smaller company. Someone
would be forced to accept a stake and a management role in the other
company. These effects certainly would influence and might dictate the
choices of the Covered Shareholders.
Taxation
Non-pro rata division of the securities of the two Microsoft
offshoots could resolve the Covered Shareholders’ cross-ownership
problem without causing them to sell shares immediately and incur
accelerated capital gains tax. One must keep in mind, however, that
unless a tax-free reorganization is achieved, all shareholders with gains
on their stock would bear a substantial cost. Thus, straying from the
standard divisive transaction models in order to devise a more ideal
solution may be problematic. Clever tax lawyers, one can assume,
would be able to craft a non-pro rata solution that satisfies all parties as
50.Microsoft proxy statements indicate a consistent decline in Gates’ stock
ownership from 24.6% in 1994 to 13.7% in 2000. Proxy statements for 1997 through
2000 are available at <http://www.microsoft.com/msft/sec.htm>.
51.Of course Gates also disposes of shares on a regular basis for charitable
purposes; diversification clearly is not his sole motivation. See Microsoft Corp., Bill
Gates’ Biography, available at < http://www.microsoft.com/billgates/bio.csp>.
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well as the IRS. The issue, however, must not be overlooked.
Pro Rata Spin Off Followed by Neutralized Voting
Given the problems highlighted above with attempting to break
up Microsoft through a conventional pro rata spin-off of one of the
businesses or through non-pro rata division of the securities, it is worth
considering whether still other alternatives might be available. In this
section an additional alternative is presented: a pro rata spin-off
followed by neutralization of Covered Shareholder voting in one of the
Microsoft offshoots. This method could not be adopted without
modifying Judge Jackson’s decree, which prohibits the Covered
Shareholders from owning stock in both of the companies, but it would
be consistent with the spirit and goals of the order.
Presumably the government’s objective in prohibiting the
Covered Shareholders from owning an interest or otherwise being
involved in both Microsoft offshoots is to reduce the chance of unlawful
coordination between these companies. One can understand that
prohibiting Gates, for example, from holding a management role in both
firms might not be enough. As a large stockholder in both firms
following a pro rata spin-off, he would be in a position to influence both
of the companies even absent an executive role in one of them. His
influence over the non-managed firm would be reduced significantly,
however, if his votes in that firm were neutralized. The idea, then,
would be to separate the businesses through a pro rata spin-off, prohibit
the Covered Shareholders from retaining any managerial role in one of
the offshoots, and neutralize the votes of the Covered Shareholders in
the non-managed company.
Implementing Vote Neutralization
One way to accomplish this result would be to issue the Covered
Shareholders non-voting shares in one of the companies. Issuing nonvoting shares, however, would transfer value from the Covered
Shareholders to the remaining shareholders. Non-voting shares tend to
trade at a discount to shares with voting power.52 Gates, moreover,
52. See Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights,
14 J . FIN. ECON. 33 (1985); Ronald C. Lease et al., The Market Value of Control in
Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983). For a discussion of the
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would lose his control premium if the voting power of his shares were
permanently revoked.
Issuing non-voting shares would be overkill, however. There is no
reason to limit the voting power of a third party that purchased shares
from the Covered Shareholders. Third party purchasers should be able
to vote these shares because they would not be in a position to influence
coordination between the Microsoft offshoots.
Rather than issuing non-voting shares, the vote of a Covered
Shareholder in one of the firms could simply be neutralized until the
Covered Shareholder disposes of his stock to an unaffiliated third party.
In this way, the value of the shares would not be diminished, but the
risk of coordination would be removed. Neutralization could take one
of two forms. First, the Covered Shareholders could be prohibited from
voting the shares as long as they hold them. The loss of votes could be
problematic, however, if majority approval of all outstanding shares is
required to approve a merger, a charter amendment, or some other
major corporate decision.
Thus, a second approach is probably superior. The shares could be
placed in trust with instructions to the trustee to vote the shares in
proportion to the actual vote of the remaining outstanding shares. In
this way, the Covered Shareholders would have no influence on the
outcome of voting and no influence on the management of that
company. Of course, the trust arrangement should not restrict the
Covered Shareholders from selling or otherwise disposing of the shares,
and the trust would end with the sale of these shares to an unaffiliated
third party who would receive normal voting rights.
Neutralization of shareholder voting rights is not unprecedented.
Recognizing the burden that would be borne by individuals if forced to
divest themselves of large numbers of shares immediately, courts
overseeing antitrust actions in the past have crafted remedies that
include elements of vote neutralization.53 In 1912, for example, E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Company was forced to spin off a substantial
fraction of its explosives manufacturing business to two newly created
companies, Hercules Powder Company and Atlas Powder Company.54
The securities of Hercules and Atlas were distributed to the du Pont
shareholders, but voting rights were stripped from half of the shares
evidence see Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 144-46 (1987).
53.For a more recent example of neutralization, see In re Gaylord Container
Corp. Shareholder Litig., 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000).
54. See 1 WHITNEY, supra note 36, at 193.
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that were issued to twenty-seven stockholders who had been named as
individual defendants in the antitrust action.55
In 1950 a district court ordered certain officers, directors, and
large shareholders of Alcoa who also held shares in Aluminum Limited
(which owned the big Canadian aluminum manufacturer, Alcan) to
dispose of their shares in Alcoa or Aluminum Limited within ten years.56
Until the shares were sold, the voting rights were transferred to
trustees.57
Comparison with Previously Considered Methods of Division
The vote neutralization arrangement considered in this Article
would be superior to a conventional spin-off followed by the forced sale
of shares. Because the Covered Shareholders could hold the neutralized
shares in one of the companies for some time, they would not be forced
to accept a fire sale price. Of course, we would not expect the
neutralized shares to be held for long. These shares would be of greater
value to a third party who could vote them. But this arrangement
would provide the Covered Shareholders with flexibility that would
reduce the penalties discussed above. Gates, for example, could choose
to sell his block after some period and reap the associated control
premium, or he could choose to sell or donate the shares gradually in
order to manage his income and taxes.
As compared with non-pro rata distribution of the securities, this
third approach has advantages and disadvantages. Because the shares
would be divided pro rata, there would be no need to value the offshoots
and no risk of transferring value between the shareholders. The
Covered Shareholders would not become less diversified through the
process, and they would not have to worry about the relative size of the
offshoots in selecting the company they wish to manage. On the other
hand, however, this third approach does force the Covered Shareholders
to retain nonvoting shares that lack the value of control or to bear the
tax cost of selling the neutralized shares. Under a non-pro rata scheme
of distribution, the Covered Shareholders would not face accelerated
taxation of gains, nor the prospect of holding nonvoting shares.
Even though the vote-neutralization method would be less costly
55. See id.
56. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 91 F. Supp. 333, 418-19 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
57. See 2 WHITNEY, supra note 36, at 99.
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to the Covered Shareholders than a conventional spin-off followed by
immediate sale, it would still impose costs on these shareholders. They
would not be able to maintain both the voting power and tax deferral
that they currently enjoy. But overall, it might turn out to be the least
costly method for dividing Microsoft’s securities. Thus, even though this
method would require amending the breakup order, it would be worth
considering in the event that a breakup ultimately is pursued.
CONCLUSION
Dividing the ownership of the Microsoft offshoots is far from
being as straightforward as the government has suggested or as the trial
court apparently assumed. Prohibiting Gates and any other Covered
Shareholder from owning an interest in both offshoots adds a great deal
of complexity to the conventional process of spinning off a business
division. As shown in this Article, any method of dividing the securities
in compliance with this requirement would either (i) impose a
significant cost on Microsoft’s large shareholders or (ii) create a risk of a
substantial transfer of value among Microsoft’s shareholders.
The costs and risks that we have identified have not as yet been
factored into the larger analysis, but they should be considered in
weighing the total social costs and benefits of a breakup. Moreover, if
Microsoft ultimately is to be broken up, these costs and risks must be
addressed in designing the specific plan of separation. In short, these
corporate finance issues should be recognized and taken into account in
any future examination of the breakup order.

